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Conservatives and the Court
Robert F. Nagel
The newly elected Republican president will soon nominate a replacement for the late Justice Antonin Scalia, and it now seems 
likely that Republican nominees will dominate the Supreme Court for 
the foreseeable future. During the campaign, candidate Donald Trump 
promised to select conservatives who would practice “judicial restraint.” 
This continues the pattern set by Republican presidents going back to 
Richard Nixon, who vigorously announced his intention to turn back 
the tide of activist decision-making inaugurated by the Warren Court. 
For almost all of the ensuing four and a half decades, Republican ap-
pointees have constituted a working majority. And yet, from 1973 when 
the justices decreed a constitutional right to abortion, through 2015 
when they set aside the traditional understanding of marriage, the 
Court has continued to exercise unbridled power. It is certainly time to 
consider what, if any, relationship there is between conservative politi-
cal thought and judicial restraint.
There are some obvious reasons to believe that conservative justices 
will practice judicial restraint. Conservatives, after all, are thought to 
favor maintaining the present state of affairs and honoring past prac-
tices and traditions. It makes some sense to think that they will not 
use constitutional interpretation to usher in vast social and political 
changes. Conservatives are also thought of, especially by their critics, 
as being cautious, conventional, and rule-oriented. Surely conservative 
justices can be expected to avoid imaginative legal interpretive methods, 
to stick to hoary legal authorities like the constitutional text and its 
authors’ intentions, and to practice the gradualism and concreteness of 
the ancient common law. 
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Finally, conservatives are thought to disapprove generally of govern-
ment power, of interference with markets, and of centralized control. 
It is reasonable, then, to assume that conservative justices will not add 
to an already lengthy list of areas subject to national authority by con-
verting matters long left to states or localities into national issues of 
constitutional dimension. To a limited extent, the performance of the 
Court since the early 1970s confirms these linkages between conser-
vative political thought and judicial restraint. Certainly, Republican 
appointees have engendered a renewed attention to traditional legal 
authorities like text and history. 
Nevertheless, under the Burger Court, then the Rehnquist Court, 
and now the Roberts Court, judicial intervention in virtually all areas 
of American life has become normal. The seismic changes imposed by 
the post-Warren Court’s expansion of the right to privacy is only a part 
of the story. In area after area — decreeing that the Ten Commandments 
must be removed from a courthouse wall, requiring the admission of 
women into military academies, protecting nude dancing as speech, to 
give just three examples — the Court has imposed significant changes 
on ever-expanding segments of public life. At the same time, a Court 
populated with justices chosen to restrain judicial power has, more of-
ten and more emphatically than the Warren Court, insisted on judicial 
supremacy over constitutional issues.
Observers tend to explain this record by engaging in psychological 
and sociological speculations about, for instance, the insidious influence 
of an Ivy League education. Such explanations may be plausible, but 
they are limited in that they assume the causes of continuing judicial 
activism lie outside of conservative political philosophy itself. Is that 
really true?
the trouble with Activism
The way to begin examining this assumption is to ask why conservatives 
thought that the Warren Court’s activism was an illegitimate practice. The 
primary component to the charge of activism was the claim that the Court’s 
landmark decisions too often rested on weak reasoning and departed from 
constitutional text and legal precedent. Because critics thought that the 
Warren Court was unconstrained by legal standards, they also argued that 
it was making moral, political, or practical judgments of a kind appropri-
ately made by politicians, private associations, and individuals. 
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To make legally unjustified judgments using considerations that non-
lawyers feel competent to make might have seemed wrong but relatively 
unimportant if the consequences of the Court’s decisions had been lim-
ited. But critics were reacting to the fact that Warren Court decisions 
required major alterations in social conditions and individual conduct, 
alterations that affected people directly and in crucial ways. The amount 
of power exercised by the Warren Court suggested to critics another way 
in which the justices were unrestrained. Existing practices and tradi-
tional norms have, for many people, a reassuring, familiar aspect, and so 
interference with them requires a certain boldness or audacity. In short, 
the Court was not being restrained by the risk of failure. 
Over the years, the charge of activism has largely been drained of 
force by confusing and sometimes cynical usage. Nevertheless, the 
content of the notion of “activism” should make it clear that highly sig-
nificant moral and societal considerations are implicated. If the Court’s 
determinations are widely understood to be based on factors other than 
legal authority, the advantages of a system perceived as resting on the 
rule of law are jeopardized. Moreover, a Court freed from legal con-
straints is unpredictable; no issue can be assumed to be settled, and 
no way of life can be relied upon. Justices perceived as being driven by 
hubris to displace more appropriate decision-makers risk undermining 
the self-respect and self-reliance of those displaced. Mandates from the 
nation’s Supreme Court that initiate sudden and sweeping changes can 
increase the sense in parts of the public of impotence, uncertainty, alien-
ation, and anger. And — if conservative thinkers are right to believe that 
practices and traditions hold much wisdom and, in any event, deserve to 
be honored — some or all of the “progress” initiated by the Court may 
prove more costly and damaging than alternative mechanisms might 
have been.
Given these stakes, the conviction that appointing conservatives 
to the Court would naturally produce a significantly more restrained 
Court seems entirely understandable. Indeed, the argument for restraint 
seems little more than a reflection of conservative instincts and the argu-
ment for activism a plain manifestation of the progressive impulse. The 
Court’s record over the past four and a half decades, however, is utterly 
at odds with these expectations.
The list of conservative justices who have contributed to the record of 
judicial activism since 1970 is long and includes most of the Republican 
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appointees. What impulse did they not restrain? What idea could they 
not resist? The paradigmatic decisions on abortion and same-sex mar-
riage, while some 40 years apart, are intellectually so close as to point 
the way toward an answer. 
In both cases, the Court recounts in apparently respectful and eru-
dite terms the long cultural history of attitudes on, in the first case, 
abortion and, in the second, the nature of marriage. But in both cases, 
it turns out that this history is not determinative. In the case of abortion, 
it is not determinative because medical ethicists, legal thinkers, public-
health professionals, and others had never come to agreement about 
when human life begins. In the case of same-sex marriage, history is not 
determinative in large part because attitudes about homosexuality and 
marriage had recently begun to change in some quarters. In short, in 
both Roe v. Wade and Obergefell v. Hodges, past practices and traditional 
understandings, as well as currently prevailing political sentiments, are 
recounted but put aside. Unweighted by the historical and the political, 
the Court is freed to come to its own conclusions.
In Roe and also in Obergefell, the Court’s conclusions turn out to be 
original. On abortion, while the annals of human history could not pro-
duce a moral consensus, seven members of the Court are able to propose a 
moral calculus whereby a woman’s interest in privacy strangely diminishes 
with each trimester of pregnancy while the state’s interest in protecting 
potential life just as mysteriously increases. Thus, the Court is able to think 
of a solution that had evaded all those thinkers across human history. 
On same-sex marriage, the Court’s solution is not so complex or 
obviously unprecedented, as a number of states and foreign countries 
recognized same-sex marriage in the years preceding the decision. But 
the Court does assert, repeatedly but without explanation, that, while 
marriage is not necessarily between a man and a woman, it is neces-
sarily between only two individuals. Thus, as in Roe, the Court thinks 
of a solution that departs from most of human history not only in the 
right it bestows but also, since polygamy has ancient roots and modern 
adherents in a number of cultures, in the limits it places on that right.
Two of the most stunning decisions ever issued by the Supreme Court 
were thus authored by Republican appointees, Justices Harry Blackmun 
and Anthony Kennedy. These decisions cannot be viewed as law in any 
conventional sense. They represent nothing more than the mental effort 
of a few individuals attempting to improve society as they understand it. 
Robert F. Nagel ·  Conservatives and the Court
41
This plain fact suggests that conservative jurists may be unable to escape 
from an underlying commitment, openly embraced by progressives, to 
the Enlightenment’s faith in the capacity of the unencumbered human 
mind, that is, the mind operating independently of history and tradi-
tion and practice.
reAsoned Abstr Action
The evidence for this possibility is so pervasive and familiar that con-
servative jurists’ commitment to Enlightenment rationality does not, 
perhaps, seem surprising. But many of the same people who are not 
surprised continue to think that a conservative political philosophy is 
likely to produce judicial restraint. These two ideas can be held at the 
same time because it is assumed that the dangerous hubris and adven-
turism of Enlightenment rationality can be mitigated and contained by 
the conservative’s respect for tradition.
The term used by Justice Kennedy to convey this possibility is “rea-
soned judgment,” a phrase that he rightly traces to the great conservative 
justice John Marshall Harlan. The use of the term as a justification for 
a judicial decision is perplexing if it is meant to distinguish the Court’s 
determination from the judgments of others. Surely, Justice Kennedy 
cannot mean that the beliefs of all those who have been committed to 
the traditional understanding of marriage are unreasoned. Thoughtful 
conservative justices like Kennedy and Harlan must be using the term 
to convey their sense of reluctance and hesitation. It is a way of saying 
that they have given due weight to the wisdom that adheres in tradition 
and practice and that they are imposing their own judgment only after 
performing their professional duty carefully.
Here then we can see in action the effect of a conservative philosophy 
on judicial behavior. But what, precisely, is being explained or justified by 
expressing a sense of duty and reluctance? To what kind of conclusions 
are the justices reluctantly driven? The answer lies in the crucial step that 
the Court takes in both the abortion decision and the same-sex marriage 
decision and, indeed, in most of the inexplicably activist decisions that 
Republican appointees have been partially responsible for over the past 
four and a half decades. That step is to define the right at issue abstractly, 
as “broad principles rather than specific requirements.” 
In Roe, the right of privacy is said to include abortion because 
the right of privacy is defined as autonomy over those choices that 
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importantly affect the quality of a person’s life. In Obergefell the right 
of privacy is said to include the right to marry someone of the same 
sex because the right to privacy is defined as those “intimate choices 
that define personal identity and beliefs.” What the justices cannot in 
good faith avoid is their premise about the level of generality at which 
the principle inherent in historical and political understandings should 
be conceived.
This resort to broad principles is the basic intellectual underpinning 
of modern constitutional law. It is employed not just when the Court 
uses history and tradition as authority for inferring implied rights (such 
as the right to abortion and marriage) but also when it interprets textual 
provisions (including the equal protection clause, the religion clauses, 
and so on). Once the general principle is announced, the Court imple-
ments it deductively, by employing doctrines, propositions, tests, and 
maxims that are attempts to link the specific outcome in the case with 
the general principle. Thus the Court has utilized a panoply of legal 
abstractions to reshape society in both profound and particular ways.
The centrality of principle was authoritatively rationalized by perhaps 
the most influential legal philosopher of our time, Ronald Dworkin, 
who went so far as to argue that constitutional principles should be 
stated “at the most general possible level.” The effect of Dworkin’s argu-
ment has been almost magical. It has enabled the modern Court to sit 
as a continuing convention of minds, unencumbered by the past while 
claiming to speak for the past. It has enabled conservatives to claim that 
their judgment is “reasoned” because it is a thoughtful extension of the 
wisdom already available in the text and in traditional standards, both 
formal and informal. This wisdom is thought to be implicitly present 
even if it was unrecognized either by the authors of the text or by the 
individuals and communities responsible for informal understandings.
The reliance on abstraction has not gone entirely unchallenged. In 
the course of a case that ended by undermining traditional rules on 
the parental rights of non-custodial, unmarried fathers, Justice Scalia 
argued that constitutional rights should be defined at the most specific 
level found in relevant traditions and practices. Later, in a case in which 
the Court rejected an asserted right to assisted suicide, a majority went 
some distance toward adopting Scalia’s position, but more recently the 
Court has emphatically returned to its usual practice of generalizing 
rights beyond what was historically recognized. 
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The Court has also largely rejected Scalia’s related argument (made 
when the Court invalidated the centuries-old practice of political pa-
tronage) that abstract doctrines used to implement principles should 
not themselves be used as authority to invalidate long-established cus-
toms. The justices’ continuing commitment to generalized principles 
implemented deductively through legal doctrines reflects the broader 
fact that Scalia’s position is largely incomprehensible to the modern 
mind, whether liberal or conservative.
The basic rationale for Scalia’s position is that only the narrowest 
possible statement of a principle is an accurate reflection of what has tra-
ditionally been respected and protected. Since the claimed source of the 
Court’s authority to enforce an implied right is the long acceptance of 
the right in American political practices, it would seem that an accurate 
account of those practices would be essential. The most common basis 
for the nearly universal rejection of Scalia’s lonely but apparently sen-
sible position is that, if a right is defined narrowly according to what has 
long been protected, the Court’s interpretations will only reflect older 
understandings and thus, as it is commonly phrased, the Constitution 
will not live or grow or evolve. 
Why this objection is so widely thought to be unanswerable is baf-
fling. After all, the underlying issue Justice Scalia was presenting was 
whether the Court is justified in altering the judgments inherent in his-
tory — that is, whether and how constitutional meaning should change 
or evolve. That question cannot be answered by assuming that interpre-
tive methods must allow the justices to treat the Constitution’s meaning 
as evolving. That is a way to circumvent the question, not address it.
From this perspective, Justice Kennedy’s reliance on “reasoned judg-
ment” as a justification for amending the traditional understanding of 
the right to marry is not a justification at all. It merely signals a failure to 
imagine the possibility of deferring to judgments held by many others 
in many circumstances, even when those judgments seem misguided 
or worse. It signals a failure to imagine the possibility of restraint in the 
face of a jurist’s conviction that received wisdom is, on sober reflection, 
inadequate and in need of improvement. 
But a stronger argument underlies this sometimes-unthinking rejec-
tion of Scalia’s proposal. Scalia’s argument against abstraction seems to 
the modern mind to be an argument for unreasoning acceptance of his-
torical understandings. To demand reasons is necessarily to attempt to 
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conceive of some principle that might justify the particular practice. The 
principle that explains and justifies the practice will be more general 
than the “rule laid down.” Thus, it would be literally irrational for the 
Court to accept the historical definition of a right at the narrowest level 
of abstraction. Viewed this way, the elevation of the level of generality at 
which the historically based right is defined is not an act of willfulness 
but of reasoned fidelity.
Here, then, is the relevant question about placing philosophical con-
servatives on the Court: Do any of the various inclinations and ideas 
that are commonly collected under the label “conservative” provide an 
effective intellectual basis for consistently declining the modern prac-
tice of interpreting historical practices according to the degree to which 
those practices can be given a reasoned justification by judges? To an-
swer that question, we need to inquire into the nature of conservative 
ideas in legal thinking. 
the limits of textuAlism
The conservative critique of modern judicial activism includes a num-
ber of elements. Most are joined in the trend, led by the late Justice 
Scalia, toward increased reliance on constitutional text and its original 
meaning. This position necessarily honors the past, as conservatives are 
reputed to do. It is conventionally legalistic, as conservatives are sup-
posed to be. And in enforcing textual limits on government power, it 
reflects conservative distrust of governmental power. 
This form of textualism also holds out, as conservatives have advo-
cated, the possibility of judicial restraint. Because the Court is restricted 
to enforcing the meaning of the text, its power can be constrained to 
the subject matter of that text. For this reason, judicial power will not, 
so goes the theory, come down unpredictably, landing potentially any-
where. When exercised, that power will be based on interpretative 
considerations in which judges have traditionally been thought compe-
tent. There will be, then, at most limited and defensible displacement 
of other competent decision-makers. The exercise of power might well, 
it is admitted, have grave consequences for people’s lives and entail un-
predictable risks. But the justification for this exercise of power is not 
the preferences or beliefs or even the ideals of the individual justices, 
but rather the widely accepted authority of the nation’s foundational 
legal document.
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Scalia’s textualism, as a form of judicial restraint, has had much more 
influence than his advocacy of defining tradition at its lowest possible 
level of abstraction. But as an implementation of modern conservative 
philosophy, it has not significantly reined in judicial activism by con-
servatives on the Court. The reasons are inescapable and, thus, have 
applied even to some positions taken by Justice Scalia himself. 
The fundamental problem is that textualism runs up against other te-
nets of conservatism. Respect for precedent, for example, would require 
abandoning textual meaning when whole lines of prior decisions depart 
from what was written and ratified. If those prior decisions gradually 
approved basic and far-reaching changes in the operation of govern-
ment (the modern administrative state comes to mind), overturning 
precedent not only conflicts with certain tenets of conservative legal-
ism, but also with conservatives’ belief that imponderably consequential 
changes ought not be initiated by the Court. Very serious conservative 
thinkers on and off the Court, jurists like Justice Scalia and scholars like 
Richard Epstein, have abandoned legalism for a kind of statesmanlike 
pragmatism in such circumstances. 
Devotion to textual meaning also becomes difficult for a conservative 
when the written words, perhaps because they are vague or open-ended, 
seem to call for judgments outside the historical meaning of the text. 
This problem is acute when historical evidence indicates that the provi-
sion was intended to call for judgments outside the text. Such difficulties 
prompted Justice Scalia to propose that henceforth the principles 
protected by the words “due process of law” should be drawn from 
tradition and practice, as many cases had held, but at the most accurate, 
the narrowest, level of generality. Without this backstop, a conventional 
legalist, when interpreting words that are themselves open-ended or that 
have been authoritatively interpreted as being open-ended, would be 
forced into the same kinds of unpredictable and disruptive decisions 
criticized as judicial activism. 
In the end, then, conservative jurists are forced to rely, at least in part, 
on some form of traditionalism in their efforts to practice judicial restraint. 
For most of the justices, this has meant reliance on their own reasoned 
judgment about the principles inherent in political and cultural tradi-
tions. In operation this amounts to, as I have already indicated, an effort 
at respectful regard for history and a careful, even reluctant willingness to 
change the specific understandings and practices that have predominated. 
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Conscientious regard for deep-seated behaviors and beliefs seems to 
be, at least potentially, a major impediment to the sort of deliberate 
centralized problem-solving associated with judicial activism. Moreover, 
because this kind of caution and respect subordinates individual judg-
ment to the implicit or explicit judgments of others, it reflects a range 
of conservative sensibilities, including a preference for the concrete over 
the abstract, an appreciation for the complexity of human affairs, a fear 
of hubris, and a somewhat pessimistic attention to risk and cost.
Traditionalism, then, reflects a major, even a unifying, intellec-
tual strain of what can be called a conservative political philosophy. 
Moreover, tradition as a way of understanding constitutional meaning 
has deep roots in American jurisprudence and has been utilized by con-
servative justices throughout the years of their (numerical) domination 
of the Court. Nevertheless, attention to and respect for historical under-
standings and practices cannot be said to have led to judicial restraint. 
In fact, reasoned judgments by conservative justices about this country’s 
constitutional traditions have produced, as in the instances of the right 
to abortion and the right to same-sex marriage, archetypal instances of 
activism. At lower levels of visibility and controversy, they have also led 
to the relentless broadening and the numbing routinization of judicial 
intervention in public affairs.
The issue, then, is whether conservatism as a philosophy necessarily 
entails “reasoned judgment” about the meaning of customary prac-
tices. Is there at least a version of that philosophy that convincingly 
supports Justice Scalia’s proposal that the justices should describe tradi-
tions narrowly and accurately? Or does conservative thought require 
that the Court describe traditional norms at some higher level of gen-
erality, that is, as principles requiring judicially imposed alterations in 
prevailing practices? 
The works of the British statesman and writer Edmund Burke are 
the most widely known articulation of a conservative political philoso-
phy that can provide intellectual support for Justice Scalia’s position on 
tradition, and thus for the possibility of conservative judicial restraint. 
Burke’s writings are important because he rejects the idea that an indi-
vidual mind’s abstractions and deductions can be trusted as a source of 
knowledge or wisdom. Therefore, to derive the definition of a right or 
its application from generalized principles, rather than from the actual 
practices of a people, would seem to be folly. 
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Burke was not, of course, against thinking about how political life 
should be carried on, but he believed the collective, accumulating 
thought of many people over many years was superior to the thinking 
of a few individuals operating in the present. Moreover, Burke specifi-
cally rejected the notion that old wisdom is valuable only if it is based 
on reasons that are evident and satisfactory today.
As Anthony Kronman saw, Burke believed that continuity among 
generations is a unique aspect of human life, distinguishing humans 
from “the flies of a summer.” This capacity is therefore valuable in itself. 
Moreover, describing the British as “generally men of untaught feel-
ings,” Burke praised them for cherishing their prejudices “because they 
are prejudices.” Even intellectuals (“men of speculation”), who seek to 
“discover the latent wisdom which prevails in [prejudices]” do not think 
it wise to “cast away the coat of prejudice, and to leave nothing but the 
naked reason.” Reason for Burke was, in important instances, secondary 
to sentiments. Passions, he believed, can “instruct our reason.” 
The modern demand that widespread understandings and practices 
be explained by and rationalized into abstract principles is, then, in 
direct conflict with some of Burke’s views about the sources and nature 
of political wisdom. To the question that in recent times seems so un-
answerable — why should a justice be restrained in the face of personal 
conviction? — these aspects of Burke’s thinking supply a direct answer: 
because an individual’s present sense of conviction cannot be trusted. 
r AtionAl tr AditionAlism
There are, however, other aspects to Burke’s thought. Much in his life 
and writings acknowledges that intellect, if exercised respectfully, can 
improve social practices. While he objected to the inflexible application 
of principle in politics, he knew that the “confused jumble” of particu-
lars must be organized into principles. Moreover, as is well known, his 
political life as a Whig provides a long record of reformist proposals 
that he no doubt thought were based on principles that made sense of 
existing British traditions. 
Clearly, for Burke reform contrived by intellect could be valuable, 
at least if it begins with an accurate and respectful consideration of the 
past. The question of how often and how far existing practices should 
be changed is, given Burke’s understanding of the nature of wisdom 
in politics, a question of context and degree. Even ruptures from very 
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widespread and prolonged traditional understandings, such as those 
about the nature of marriage, are not necessarily ruled out. They are not 
ruled out, that is, as conservative reforms initiated by inventive, respect-
ful minds somewhere in a political system. They might, nevertheless, be 
ruled out as reforms initiated by a court rather than by, say, a parliament 
or a religious institution. 
But aspects of Burke’s thought at least indirectly suggest that judi-
cially imposed reforms are compatible with his political philosophy. In 
fact, some of Burke’s ideas about government structure have resonance 
with arguments made by progressive apologists for the role of the mod-
ern Supreme Court. 
Legal theorists have long argued that the Court’s expansive defini-
tion of individual rights is a necessary protection against majoritarian 
excesses. The American system, it is often observed, is not a pure ma-
joritarian system, and the Court acts to check abuses against minority 
interests and rights. The excesses that arise from popular pressures 
within state and local governments are seen as especially dangerous 
because they often constitute a defiant and centrifugal force. The au-
thority of the Court when enforcing the fundamental law represents the 
highest authority of the nation and must be asserted to prevent chaotic 
unraveling. Important legal scholars have described the justices as intel-
lectual aristocrats who have the training and opportunity to inject a 
higher level of erudition and judgment into the public arena. 
All of these arguments track aspects of Burke’s thought — his distrust of 
democracy, his support for royal authority, his concern about excessive 
decentralization, his belief in checks and balances, and the special role 
he saw for a natural aristocracy. Aspects of Burke’s thinking, then, sug-
gest that the American constitutional scheme, rather than a product of 
ubiquitous Enlightenment rationalism, is a deeply conservative system. 
And what has been decried as judicial activism by many conservatives 
would also have to be regarded as an implementation of conservative 
political philosophy. 
This surprising and somewhat perverse conclusion, however, omits 
the aspect of the British political heritage that relates most directly to 
the issue of judicial power. Part of the political heritage Burke cherished 
was the common law. What does that legal tradition tell us about the 
modern judicial practice of imposing reform by way of reasoned judg-
ment about tradition and practice? 
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One view of the common law is that it was a rigid and obscure in-
tellectual system that at bottom rested on an irrational attachment 
to political traditions and the past. Thus, the prominent legal scholar 
David Strauss asserts, “Historically, the common law tradition has been 
burdened with a degree of mysticism and also, at times, with excessive 
conservatism.” Strauss conceives of the essential defect in this system as 
an insistence on “adhering to the practices of the past just because of 
their age.” Happily, however, due regard for the past can be compatible 
with rationality if historical practices are not seen as authoritative, but 
as an antidote to the intellectual limitations to which the human mind 
is subject. Strauss acknowledges the force in Burke’s argument that con-
sulting the experiences and judgments implicit in traditions is a valuable 
way to expand understanding. 
He concludes reassuringly, however, that “rational traditionalism” 
is possible. This enlightened version of traditionalism respects the past 
“but also specifies the circumstances in which traditions must be re-
jected because they are unjust or obsolete.” In a passage foreshadowing 
Justice Kennedy’s approach in the same-sex marriage case, Strauss adds 
that the relevant question is this: “Are we sufficiently confident in the 
abstract or theoretical argument to justify casting aside the work of gen-
erations?” The problem, for Strauss and for Burke, is to explain how a 
strong sense of conviction can justify alterations in customary practices 
and understandings when it is precisely the reliability of that sense of 
conviction that is at issue.
This conundrum may be more of a difficulty for the contemporary 
mind than it was for Burke. There is serious reason to doubt that the 
British common law conceived of the judicial role as imposing progres-
sive change. It is true that common-law judges believed they had a role 
to play in revising past mistakes, but the mistakes at issue were mainly 
errors in prior cases. In fact, as Blackstone makes clear, the rationale 
for revising precedent was that the prior ruling had not been an ac-
curate reflection of “the established custom of the realm.” Customary 
practices being a manifestation (or at least the best approximation) of 
reason, precedent was to be revised when it had been untrue to custom, 
not when the judge believed that a judicial ruling could improve upon 
custom. In Burke’s time, when courts misread custom or if they were 
true to custom but custom needed to evolve, judicial rulings could be 
changed by Parliament. That institution was a focal point for the many 
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intersecting opinions and pressures arising from the complex social in-
teractions that Burke thought enriched and checked one another.
As already indicated, there are several important aspects to Burke’s 
thinking, aside from his willingness to see custom reformed, that 
support the conclusion that he could not or should not have been com-
mitted to a common-law model that involves, to use Strauss’s words, 
“excessive conservatism.” Nevertheless, there is at least one available ex-
planation for excluding — or at least minimizing — the judiciary’s role 
in employing intellect to reform customary understandings and prac-
tices. That explanation emerged later in the thought of another British 
conservative, Michael Oakeshott.
Oakeshott claimed that the extraction of a general principle from 
the specifics of a customary practice is not a reasoned or enlightened 
way to understand that practice. Oakeshott saw that such principles are 
necessarily abridgements and simplifications. A custom is a “pattern of 
behavior” and the “coherence” of the custom lies in the pattern itself. 
Justice Scalia later made much the same point, if less elegantly, when 
he insisted that implied rights in constitutional law should be defined 
according to the most specific account of the underlying tradition. 
Oakeshott noted that in the modern age principles are presented as “gifts 
straight from the gods.” But in fact they are, he said, efforts to employ 
the mind as an entity standing outside of experience. This, according to 
Oakeshott, is a misunderstanding of the nature of knowledge. 
Modern Enlightenment rationalists must find Oakeshott’s account of 
the nature of understanding incomprehensible except as a rejection of 
rationality. Oakeshott, however, is clear that the abstractions, principles, 
and doctrines that constitute the expression of the rational mind are a 
component of understanding. He thought, however, that understanding 
cannot be separated from activity and experience. The complexity, the 
subtlety, the feel of an activity — whether cooking or scientific inquiry 
or politics — is lost by the methods of rationalism if they are not com-
bined with the practical knowledge that comes from engaging in the 
activity itself. 
The problem with modern rationalism, therefore, is that it under-
stands the mind to be operating independently of experience. Moreover, 
it is a fact that some decision-makers are more insulated from the experi-
ence of political life than are others. Certainly judges are relatively cut 
off from the interactions, the jostling, and the conflict that constitute 
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and create patterns of customary behavior and norms. At a minimum, 
the role of a judge requires a degree of detachment and impartiality that 
is incompatible with robust participation in political and social life. 
Blackstone’s conception of the common-law judge — and Oakeshott’s 
and probably Burke’s — was premised not on a rejection of reason but 
on a belief that it is from reason combined with experience that a full 
understanding can emerge. It follows that the common-law judge’s duty 
is to embody customary understandings in law. 
experience And lAw
A strand of conservative political philosophy, then, is consistent with 
judicial restraint. It is almost lost in the welter of other conservative 
ideas and the general dominance of Enlightenment rationalism. But it 
is there in Burke, in the British common-law tradition, and in Scalia’s al-
most forgotten proposals. It is intermittently present in our practices — in 
judicial reliance on tradition and deference to political judgments — even 
if it is often misunderstood or ignored. 
This conservative idea is not merely that practice and tradition pro-
vide valuable intellectual resources but also that attempts to understand 
the present and the past independently of experience are inadequate. It 
follows from this that the judge’s role should not include abstract ratio-
nalization of customary standards. The judicial role should be limited 
to faithful enforcement of those standards. 
The continuing debate over the desirability of judicial restraint would 
be clarified if everyone dropped the pretense that the debate pits reason 
against an irrational attachment to the past. The debate is, or should be, 
over the nature of reason — about how and where understanding can 
best be achieved. Judicial nominees who do not appreciate this will be 
inclined to continue the Court’s long record of activism, regardless of 
the intentions of the politicians who nominate or confirm them.
